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Abstract: This paper introduces a comprehensive database of informal economic activity. 
The database focuses on measures that have strong cross-country and over time coverage: 
it includes both model-based and survey-based measures of informality and covers more 
than 160 economies for the period 1990-2018. The paper illustrates two applications of 
the database. First, it distills stylized facts of informal activity, including its declining 
trend and pervasiveness in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). Second, 
it documents the cyclical features of the informal economy. Overall, informal economy 
recessions (recoveries) do not differ significantly from those of formal economy. Like 
formal-economy business cycles, informal-economy business cycles tend to be shallower in 
advanced economies than in EMDEs. Informal employment in both advanced economies 
and EMDEs appears to be largely acyclical.  
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The livelihoods of the poor in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) often 
depend on informal economic activity. In these economies, informal-economy output on 
average accounts for about one-third of GDP and informal employment constitutes about 
70 percent of total employment (of which self-employment accounts for more than one-
half; Figure 1). In some economies in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), informal employment 
accounts for more than 90 percent of total employment and informal output for as much 
as 62 percent of official GDP (ILO 2018a; World Bank 2019). 
A large informal sector is often associated with unfavorable macroeconomic and 
development outcomes (Figure 1; Ohnsorge and Yu 2021). On average, economies with 
larger informal sectors have tended to have less access to finance for the private sector, 
lower productivity, slower physical and human capital accumulation, less educated 
workforces, and smaller fiscal resources. Some studies show that informality is associated 
with higher income inequality and poverty. Lower physical investment in the informal 
sector could reflect an unwillingness of informal firms to adopt technologies or larger scales 
of production that might make them visible to tax and other authorities. The informal 
sector, on average, is characterized by lower productivity than the formal sector because 
it tends to employ less-skilled workers; use less capital; have restricted access to funding, 
services and markets; and lack economies of scale.2 Over the business cycle, informal 
employment can provide a safety net when the formal sector sheds jobs. But workers in 
the informal economy are largely excluded from the social security system and less 
protected against negative shocks than workers in the formal sector, which could amplify 
business cycles. 
Depending on country circumstances and worker characteristics, workers and firms may 
choose to participate in the informal economy for a wide range of reasons. These have 
resulted in various measures and definitions of the informal economy. For instance, 
informal workers range from agricultural day laborers to self-employed firm owners with 
a few employees. Some of these workers may choose the informal sector for its 
innovativeness and flexibility (Maloney 2004; Perry et al. 2007). Against this drawback, 
this paper reviews conceptual and measurement issues regarding the informal economy 
and documents its main features across countries and over time. It also summarizes the 
cyclical features of the informal economy.  
Our paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, it compiles a 
comprehensive database of informality measures developed in the literature, with a focus 
on measures that have broad cross-country and long historical coverage. The resulting 
 
2 See a comprehensive analysis of long-term economic correlates of informality in Ohnsorge, Okawa, and Yu 
(2021). For work on informality and inequality, see Chong and Gradstein (2007), Loayza, Servén, and 
Sugawara (2010), Perry et al. (2007), and Rosser, Rosser, and Ahmed (2000). For features of economies 
with widespread informality, see Amaral and Quintin (2006), Docquier, Müller, and Naval (2017), Elgin et 
al. (2021), Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012), La Porta and Shleifer (2014), Loayza (2018), Loayza and 
Rigolini (2011), and World Bank (2019 and 2020). For technology adoption in informal sector, see Dabla-
Norris, Gradstein, and Inchauste (2008) and Gandelman and Rasteletti (2017). 
 
 
dataset combines, and in some cases updates, twelve cross-country databases and data 
provided by almost 90 national statistical agencies.3  Second, the paper presents two 
applications of this database. In a first step, it distills stylized facts about the informal 
economy, such as its size and evolution over time, using a wide range of informality 
measures, and tests the consistency of these stylized facts across these measures. In a 
second step, the paper documents the cyclical features of the informal economy, such as 
the duration and amplitude of recessions and recoveries.  
We present several new findings. First, we summarize the advantages and drawbacks of 
existing informality measures. Previous literature on informality has relied solely on either 
survey-based or model-based estimates. Survey-based measures can cover many 
dimensions of the informal economy, but they suffer from poor country and year coverage 
(especially for EMDEs), reporting bias, and lack of consistency in survey methods. 4 
Indirect, model-based measures of informal output stand out in their potentially 
comprehensive country and year coverage and their consistent economic meaning, but 
they rely on strong assumptions. We highlight the circumstances in which the various 
individual informality measures could be particularly helpful. This adds to earlier work 
that has focused on the limitations of a confined number of estimation methods.  
Second, the paper argues that the combination of direct, survey-based indicators with 
indirect, model-based estimates can overcome the limitations of each. Informal 
employment measures tend to cover either the number of hours worked per day in informal 
employment (“intensity” of participation in informal employment) or, regardless of the 
number of hours worked per day, the presence of informal employment (“extent” of 
participation; Meghir, Narita, and Robin 2015). Since the extent of participation in the 
informal economy and its intensity may evolve differently, informal production may move 
asynchronously with informal employment.5 Thus, measures of informal output are an 
important complement to measures of informal employment.  
Third, the paper distills the main features of the informal economy and its evolution over 
time. Three different dimensions of informality are identified here: output, employment, 
and perception. Cross-country rankings of informal output and employment are typically 
consistent. Both output and employment measures of informality have trended downward 
since 1990 and have shown some cyclicality. In contrast, perception-based measures have 
 
3 Official GDP statistics often make an adjustment for informal activity. However, the magnitude of such 
adjustments is rarely specified. In a survey in 2008, national statistical agencies for about 40 mostly 
advanced economies or economies in transition reported adjusting their official GDP statistics by amounts 
ranging from 0.8 to 31.6 percent for activity in the non-observed economy (NOE), which is a broader 
concept than the informal economy (United Nations 2008). For all reporting economies, the adjustments 
were well below those suggested by the measures of informality presented in this paper. 
4 Survey-based informality measures are based on income data from surveys or audits that differ from 
incomes declared for tax purposes (Binelli and Attanasio 2010; McCaig and Pavcnik 2015), or earnings from 
firm surveys (Almeida and Carneiro 2012; Putnins and Sauka 2015).   
5 For example, during a recession, labor may move from the formal sector to the informal sector and raise 
participation in the informal economy (Loayza and Rigolini 2011). However, due to the fall in demand 
during a recession, the intensity of participation, captured by the number of hours worked in informal 
employment, may remain the same or even drop, reducing informal output.   
 
 
tended to be highly stable over time and could, therefore, be more appropriate for cross-
country comparisons.   
Fourth, this is the first study to document the cyclical features of the informal sector in 
both advanced economies and EMDEs. Cyclical movements in informal economy output 
do not differ statistically significantly from those in formal economy output. Like the 
formal economy, the informal economy undergoes larger output movements over the 
business cycle in EMDEs than in advanced economies. Steeper recessions and stronger 
recoveries in EMDEs contribute to greater output volatility, as shown in previous studies 
(Aguiar and Gopinath 2007). Meanwhile, unlike formal employment, which contracts 
significantly in advanced economies during formal economy recessions, informal 
employment in both advanced economies and EMDEs appears largely acyclical during 
informal output business cycles. This may reflect wage movements or changes in intensity 
(measured as number of hours worked per day) in labor markets, which may bear the 
brunt of adjustment during business cycles (Guriev, Speciale, and Tuccio 2019; Meghir, 
Narita, and Robin 2015).  
The following section discusses definitions of informality and various measures of 
informality. Then, the paper documents the main features of the informal economy across 
EMDE regions and the main similarities and differences across various measures of 
informality. Next, it documents informal-economy business cycles, followed by concluding 
remarks. 
2. Definition of informality 
Informality is typically defined as market-based and legal production of goods and services 
that is hidden from public authorities for monetary, regulatory, or institutional reasons 
(Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 2010). Monetary reasons include the avoidance of 
taxes and social security contributions, regulatory reasons include the avoidance of 
government bureaucracy or regulatory burdens, and institutional reasons include 
corruption, related often to the poor quality of political institutions and weak rule of law. 
These factors affect firms and workers’ decisions to participate in the formal sector (Perry 
et al. 2007; Ulyssea 2020). For the purposes of this paper, the informal economy involves 
activities that, if recorded, would contribute to GDP, and does not cover illegal activities 
or household production (Medina and Schneider 2018; Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 
2010). This section summarizes the definitions and classifications of informality used by 
previous studies.  
The definition and classification of informality are highly context-specific. Similarly, the 
choice of informality measures will depend on the question being explored. The general 
definition referred to above encompasses many types of informal activities by workers and 
firms. 
Exit versus exclusion. Some workers and firms are “excluded” from the modern economy 
or from state benefit systems due to burdensome entry regulations and lack of human 
capital (de Soto 1989; Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén 2006; Perry et al. 2007). This type of 
 
 
informality is frequently associated with low productivity and with poorly paid and low-
skilled employment (La Porta and Shleifer 2014; Loayza 2018). Other informal workers 
voluntarily “exit” the formal sector and choose informal activity for its flexibility, 
independence, and lower regulatory compliance burdens (Blanchflower, Oswald, and 
Stutzer 2001; Falco and Haywood 2016; Günther and Launov 2012; Maloney 2004). Both 
“excluded” and “exiting” types of informality could coexist in an economy (Bosch and 
Maloney 2008, 2010; Lehmann and Pignatti 2007; Nordman, Rakotomanana, and 
Roubaud 2016).  
Subsistence informality. Other studies focus on “subsistence informality,” which is 
pervasive in lower-income countries and characterized by low-skilled technology and the 
fact that in the absence of such informal economic activity the incomes of the workers 
involved would fall below subsistence levels (Docquier, Müller, and Naval 2017).  
Evaders, avoiders and outsiders. Yet another group of studies classify informal workers 
and firms into evaders, avoiders, and outsiders depending on their compliance with 
regulations and regulations’ applicability (Kanbur 2009; Kanbur and Keen 2015). Evaders 
are firms that are covered by regulations but do not comply; avoiders are firms that 
adjust to be outside the remit of regulations; outsiders are firms that are simply not 
covered by regulations.   
Margins. More recent studies distinguish different types of informality by the entities 
engaged in informal activity, without focusing on their motivation: firms that do not 
register their business (the extensive margin) and or registered firms that hire workers 
“off the books” (the intensive margin; Ulyssea 2018, 2020).   
Specific definitions exit regarding informal workers and firms. Informal employment covers 
all workers in the informal sector and informal workers outside the informal sector (Perry 
et al. 2007; ILO 2018b). The former comprises all persons who were employed in at least 
one informal firm. The latter group consists of some self-employed and workers who are 
not employed in formal contractual arrangements or not subject to social security or 
employment benefits. 6  Some have defined informal employment more specifically as 
referring to workers who do not contribute to retirement pension schemes, which form 
part of social security (Loayza, Servén, and Sugawara 2010).  
The most commonly used proxy for the relative size of informal employment is the share 
of self-employment in total employment, capturing workers who, working on their own 
account or with one or a few partners or in a cooperative, hold the type of jobs defined 
as “self-employment jobs” (Annex; ILO 1993; La Porta and Shleifer 2014). The other 
popular measure of informal employment comprises all workers in the informal sector 
(workers in at least one informal sector enterprise, irrespective of their status in 
employment and whether it was their main or a secondary job) together with informal 
workers outside the informal sector (the self-employed and employees holding informal 
 
6 See the annex of Hussmanns (2003) for the overlap between informal employment and self-employment.   
 
 
jobs). For the remainder of the paper, informal employment will be proxied by self-
employment since data on informal employment is not available for advanced economies.  
Some studies use the following criteria to define an informal firm (ILO 2018b). First, it is 
not an incorporated enterprise that is a legal entity separate from its owners, with its own 
complete set of accounts, and it is not owned or controlled by one person or a few 
household members. Second, it is a market enterprise that sells its goods or services. 
Third, it falls into one of the following categories: it keeps the number of workers employed 
on a continuous basis and below a threshold determined by the state; it is not registered; 
or its workers are not registered. Other studies provide an alternative definition of degrees 
of firm informality on a continuum depending on size, registration, honesty of accounting, 
tax payments, mobility of workplace and access to bank credit (Benjamin and Mbaye 
2012; Mbaye, Benjamin, and Gueye 2017). 
3. Database of informality measures 
Reflecting the difficulty of measuring informality, researchers have developed a wide range 
of estimation methods to capture its scale. The database compiled for this study includes 
the twelve measures most commonly used in the literature. These can be categorized into 
two groups based on their estimation methods. The first group encompasses indirect 
model-based estimates of the relative size of informal output (that is, informal output in 
percent of official GDP). The second group encompasses direct measures gathered from 
surveys, such as labor force, household, firm, or opinion surveys. In the database, indirect 
and direct measures together cover up to 196 economies (36 advanced economies and 160 
EMDEs) and for periods as long as 1950-2018 (Table 1a and Table A1). 7 
This section describes the informality database and the limitations and advantages of 
each measure included in it. Indirect measures stand out for their broad country and long 
year coverage, but they suffer from their narrow focus on economic production and strong 
reliance on model specifications and assumptions. Direct measures capture more 
dimensions of informality and do not involve particular model specifications and 
assumptions, but they tend to have limited country and year coverage, making them less 
well suited to cross-country, time-series analyses. Indirect measures provide only a macro 
perspective on the extent of informality in an economy, whereas direct measures can also 
provide a micro perspective on how firms and workers behave in the informal sector. 
3.1 Indirect estimates 
Previous studies have used various indirect approaches to estimate the size of the informal 
sector, including the currency-demand approach (Ardizzi et al. 2014), the electricity-
demand approach (Schneider and Enste 2000), the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes 
(MIMIC) model (Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 2010), and the dynamic general 
 
7 Although some of the measures are available for periods as long as 1950-2018, the paper focuses on the 
period 1990-2018. The period choice is due to the general lack of data availability and reliability before 
1990. See Table 1 for detailed country and year coverages for the period 1990-2018, and Table A1 for a 
summary of full data coverage between 1950 and 2018. 
 
 
equilibrium (DGE) model (Elgin and Oztunali 2012; Ihrig and Moe 2004; Orsi et al. 2014). 
Among all indirect estimation methods, the MIMIC and DGE models stand out in terms 
of their long time-series and broad country coverage. For this reason, the focus here is 
mainly on the use of MIMIC and DGE models to estimate the size of informal economic 
activity. To make the measures comparable with those in the literature, both DGE-based 
and MIMIC-based estimates are reported in percent of official GDP.  
The multiple indicators multiple causes model (MIMIC). This is a type of structural 
equations models that can be used to estimate the relative size of informal economic 
activity. Two features of MIMIC are particularly important: first, it explicitly takes into 
account multiple possible causes of informal activity and captures multiple outcome 
indicators of it; second, it can readily be used to estimate informal activity across countries 
and over time. Other indirect approaches, like the currency-demand approach and the 
electricity-demand approach, condense all the features of informal activity across product 
and factor markets into just one indicator.8 The informal sector, however, shows its effects 
in various markets, which can be captured better in a MIMIC model (Schneider, Buehn, 
and Montenegro 2010). The data on causes and indicators of informal activity identified 
in the literature are largely macroeconomic data in a panel setting and can be updated 
annually.   
The limitations of the standard MIMIC model, used by Schneider, Buehn, and 
Montenegro (2010) and others, have been widely discussed in the literature (Feige 2016; 
Medina and Schneider 2018). The limitations include: 1) the use of GDP (that is, GDP 
per capita and its growth rates) as both cause and indicator variables, 2) its reliance on 
another, independent study’s base-year estimates of the informal economy to calibrate the 
size of the informal economy in percent of GDP, and 3) the sensitivity of the model’s 
estimated coefficients to alternative model specifications and sample coverage.9 These 
limitations can open the MIMIC estimates to charges of manipulation and 
misrepresentation (Breusch 2005).   
Here we replicate the most cited MIMIC study, Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010), 
to estimate the size of the informal sector in percent of official GDP.10 Six causes and 
three indicators are used in the estimation to capture the hypothesized relationships 
between the informal sector (the latent variable) and its causes and indicators. Once the 
relationships are identified and the parameters are estimated, the estimation results are 
used to calculate the MIMIC index, which gives the absolute values of the size of the 
 
8 The electricity-demand and currency-demand approaches suffer from limited data availability and are 
each subject to specific caveats. The electricity-demand model rests on the strong assumptions that all 
informal economic activity requires only the use of electricity, and the association between informal 
production and use of electricity is constant over time. The currency-demand approach rests on the 
assumption that transactions in the informal sector are paid in cash and that there is no informal sector in 
the base year (Ahumada, Alvaredo, and Canavesa 2007).   
9 Medina and Schneider (2018) try to overcome the limitation of using official GDP (which may capture 
part of the informal economy) by using night-light data to independently capture economic activity.   
10 See Annex for details on the estimation method. The estimation results from the model specification that 
ensures maximum data coverage (shown in Annex Table A2) are used here. 
 
 
informal sector after a benchmarking or calibration procedure. The MIMIC approach 
delivers a panel of estimates for 160 economies (36 advanced economies and 124 EMDEs) 
over the period 1993-2018.   
The MIMIC estimates capture the combination of both employment and productivity in 
the informal sector, whereas measures of informal employment only reflect the level of 
employment in the informal sector. Despite the comprehensive country and long time-
series coverage, MIMIC estimates do not fluctuate much over time, which makes the 
estimates less suited for time-series analyses (including the business cycle analysis in 
section 4 below).   
The DGE model (DGE). The dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model considers how 
optimizing households will allocate labor between formal and informal economies in each 
period and how the allocation changes over time (Ihrig and Moe 2004; Elgin and Oztunali 
2012). In comparison with other estimation methods, the DGE approach stands out in 
the comprehensive country and year coverage that it allows, its clear theoretical basis, 
and its applicability to policy experiments and projections (Loayza 2016).   
The DGE approach has some limitations. First, it relies on strong assumptions about the 
functional form of activity in the informal and formal sector and about the relationship 
between formal and informal productivity (Orsi, Raggi, and Turino 2014; Schneider and 
Buehn, 2016). Second, like the MIMIC approach, it requires base-year estimates of the 
informal economy from another independent study to calibrate the size of informal 
economy (Elgin and Oztunali 2012; Ihrig and Moe 2004). Third, a computable DGE model 
only captures some of the stylized facts of the informal sector. Data availability, especially 
for EMDEs, presents a challenge to matching DGE models with all aspects of informality.  
Here we use a deterministic DGE model proposed by Elgin and Oztunali (2012) to 
estimate the size of the informal sector. The model captures the essence of labor allocation 
between the formal and informal sectors and provides a mapping between the formal and 
informal economies in a dynamic setting. The model relies on two key equilibrium 
conditions for calibration and data construction processes (see Annex for model details). 
The two key equilibrium conditions are one that connects the formal and informal 
economies through labor allocation, and another that captures intertemporal substitution. 
The model results in estimates of informal output in percent of official GDP for 158 
economies (36 advanced economies and 122 EMDEs) over the period 1950-2018.  
The DGE estimates reflect the levels of both employment and productivity in the informal 
sector and stand out in their broad country and long year coverage. The time variation 
of the DGE estimates is sufficient for time-series analysis, including the business cycle 
analysis in the following sections. But the time variation of the DGE estimates relies 
partially on strong assumptions. For instance, in Elgin and Oztunali (2012), the growth 
 
 
rate of productivity in the informal sector is assumed to be a function of the growth rates 
of capital and productivity in the formal sector.11   
3.2 Survey-based (direct) estimates 
Four existing informality measures are labor-related, of which three are related to 
employment and one to pension coverage. These measures are gathered mainly from labor 
force surveys but sometimes from household surveys.   
Labor force surveys. Labor force survey-related measures have the advantages of not 
relying on strong assumptions, having no need for base-year estimates for calibration, and 
having sufficient time variation for time-series analysis. But they also have several 
limitations: the data are costly to gather, contributing to limited country and year 
coverage; survey methodologies may vary over time and across countries, limiting the 
comparability of the data; there are the typical drawbacks of survey-based data (such as 
sample bias); and employment measures cannot reflect other changes in the informal 
sector, such as in productivity and the number of working hours.   
Despite the limitations, survey-based labor-related measures can provide useful guidance 
for the construction and use of indirect informality measures. Among all labor-related 
measures, self-employment stands out in its year and country coverage and sufficient time 
variation, making it suitable for time-series analysis and cross-country comparisons.12 For 
labor-related questions, such as employment creation and destruction in the informal 
sector or social security issues, labor-related measures are typically preferred.  
The most frequently used measure is the share of self-employment in total employment 
(labeled SEMP here; La Porta and Shleifer 2014; Maloney 2004). As defined by the 1993 
International Classification of Status in Employment, self-employed workers include four 
sub-categories of jobs, as classified in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI) and by the International Labour Organization (ILO): employers, own-account 
workers, members of producers' cooperatives, and contributing family workers.13 Self-
employed workers are those who, working on their own account (own-account workers or 
employers) or with one or a few partners or in a cooperative, hold “self-employment jobs” 
 
11 In the case of Elgin and Oztunali (2012), the heavy reliance of DGE estimates on assumptions and base-
year estimates on the informal economy for calibration could be reduced by using other sources of 
information on the informal economy (for instance, survey-based estimates of informal employment).   
12 ILO also produces model-based estimates which it uses to construct an internationally comparable data 
set on the share of self-employment in total employment (https://www.ilo.org/ilostat-
files/Documents/TEM.pdf). Such model-based estimates largely rely on collected survey-based estimates 
but still could be sensitive to model specifications. Over the period 1990-2018, the pairwise correlation 
between survey-based estimates on self-employment shares and model-based estimates is 0.95. For the 
purpose of this study, survey-based estimates of self-employment shares are preferred.   
13 Self-employment largely overlaps with informal employment, but not all self-employed workers are in 
informal employment. For example, the owner of a formally registered firm is both self-employed and 
formally employed. Whereas contributing family workers are always classified as informal, workers who hold 
other types of “self-employment jobs” are classified as informal employment when their production units 




as defined above. These are jobs where the remuneration is directly dependent upon the 
profits derived from the goods and services produced.   
Two other measures are informal employment and employment outside the formal sector.14 
These are usually expressed in percent of total employment (or non-agricultural 
employment) and refer to different aspects of informality.15 Whereas employment outside 
the formal sector is an enterprise-based concept that includes persons employed by 
informal sector enterprises or in households, informal employment is a job-based concept 
and has a broader definition. Informal employment comprises all workers in the informal 
sector and informal workers outside the informal sector. Almost all persons employed in 
the informal sector are in informal employment. But not all informal employment is in 
the informal sector. For example, informal employment includes internships in the formal 
sector without contracts or pension contributions.  
For a comprehensive dataset on labor-related measures on informality, cross-country 
databases, provided by the WDI, ILO and OECD, are combined, with additional data 
gathered from various sources (see Annex for detailed information on methodologies). The 
resulting dataset on self-employment is a panel of 180 economies or regions over the period 
1955-2018. The dataset on informal employment covers 72 EMDEs from various years 
during 2000-2018 whereas the dataset on employment outside the formal sector contains 
76 EMDEs from various years during 1999-2018. Data on informal employment and on 
employment outside the formal sector are obtained from the ILO.  
Data on pension coverage are gathered from various issues of the WDI (book version, 
reported until 2012). The measure is defined as the fraction of the labor force that 
contributes to a retirement pension scheme (Loayza, Servén, and Sugawara 2010). It yields 
a panel that covers 135 economies from 1990 to 2010. The measure is suitable for analyzing 
social security issues related to the informal economy. 
Firm opinion surveys. Two datasets based on surveys of firms have outstanding coverage 
and data quality: the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, and the Executive Opinion 
Surveys conducted by the World Economic Forum. The World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
cover 140 economies over the period 2006-2018 whereas Executive Opinion Surveys cover 
154 economies over the period 2008-2018.16   
Both surveys are answered by top managers and business owners, who can be expected 
to be familiar with the business climate in the country concerned. The surveys could 
 
14 ILO presents detailed definitions of these two measures (ILO 2021a, b). Here, the harmonized series of 
these two measures, which allow for cross-country comparisons, are preferred, despite some remaining 
limitations (ILO 2021c).   
15 ILO reports these two measures both in percent of total employment and in percent of non-agricultural 
employment. Due to space limitations, the analysis here focuses on these two measures in percent of total 
employment, which are comparable with the self-employment measure.   
16 Due to survey design changes, the data collected by the Executive Opinion Surveys over the period 2004-
2007 are not comparable with those for subsequent years. The World Bank also conducts Productivity and 
Investment Climate Surveys at the firm level. Although these surveys occasionally report measures of 
informality, they are obtained from various sources and use different methodologies.   
 
 
reveal some dimensions of informality (for example, regarding the ease of doing business 
in the informal sector) that are not captured in the output or labor-related measures of 
informality. Similar to labor-related measures, measures from firm surveys also have the 
advantages of being independent of strong assumptions and base-year estimates for 
calibration.  
There are two particular drawbacks of informality measures based on firm surveys. First, 
data from firm surveys tend to have limited year coverage. Second, since perceptions tend 
not to move much over time, these types of measures do not have much time variation. 
Both drawbacks limit their application in time-series analysis. Nonetheless, they shed 
light on the perceived extent of informality in a country and can provide useful guidance 
for constructing and validating indirect model estimates.  
World Bank Enterprise Surveys compile responses on various topics (including 
informality) from face-to-face interviews with top managers and business owners in over 
161,000 companies in 144 economies. The surveys yield the following measures of 
informality that have been used in the literature (La Porta and Shleifer 2014; World 
Bank 2019): percent of firms competing against unregistered or informal firms (WB1), 
percent of firms formally registered when they started operations in the country (WB2), 
(average) number of years firms operating without formal registration (WB3), and 
percent of firms identifying practices of competitors in the informal sector as a major 
constraint (WB4). Higher values of WB1, WB3 and WB4 and a lower value of WB2 
indicate higher levels of informality. WB1 and WB4 also provide some insights into 
informal firms’ competitiveness whereas WB2 and WB3 are considered indicative of 
constraints imposed by registration requirements.  
In comparison to Enterprise Surveys, Executive Opinion Surveys provide a more balanced 
panel dataset, making them more suitable for business cycle analysis. The World 
Economic Forum (WEF) has been conducting Executive Opinion Surveys every year 
since 1979. As reported in the 2014 edition, over 13,000 executives in 144 economies were 
surveyed. From 2006, the survey has asked the question, “In your country, how much 
economic activity do you estimate to be undeclared or unregistered? (1 = Most economic 
activity is undeclared or unregistered; 7 = Most economic activity is declared or 
registered).” The average responses at the country-year level constitute a series of 
informality measures with a lower average indicating a relatively larger informal economy.   
Household surveys. Household surveys may report perceptions of the extent of informality 
in an economy or opinions on informal economic activities. The World Values Survey 
(WVS) stand out in terms of their extensive country and year coverage; others household 
surveys mainly focus on European economies.17 The WVS asked whether respondents 
considered it justifiable to cheat on taxes, with the data averaged for five periods from 
1981-1984 to 2010-2014. The responses could range from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always 
 
17 These surveys, which include the Eurobarometer Survey, European Values Survey, and the European 
Social Survey, are not used in this study because of their limited coverage of EMDEs. Details about other 
social surveys are shown in annex (Tables A1 and A3).   
 
 
justifiable). In total, 317,750 respondents from 96 economies participated in the survey. 
The average responses at the country and year level are used as a measure for attitudes 
towards informality. A higher average at the country level implies that people find 
cheating on taxes more justifiable and thus consider informal activity more acceptable. 
It is regarded as an indirect measure of informality as a lack of tax morality is associated 
with a higher level of informality (Oviedo, Thomas, and Karakurum-Özdemir 2009).  
3.3 Comparison of statistical features across measures 
For any economy, the various measures of informality will differ somewhat, both in the 
level of informality implied and in its variation over time. In general, MIMIC estimates 
indicate lower and less volatile informal sector activity than DGE estimates. This partly 
reflects the differences in the assumed underlying drivers of informality in the two 
approaches: MIMIC is based on slow-moving variables such as ones relating to 
institutional quality whereas DGE is based on more volatile variables such as 
employment, investment and productivity. In EMDEs, the share of informal activity in 
GDP (by either measure) tends to be well below the share of self-employment in total 
employment, which may reflect lower labor productivity in the informal economy than 
the formal economy or some self-employed workers contributing to the formal economy 
(Loayza 2018). 18  Survey-based measures tend to be stable over decades, potentially 
reflecting a profound rigidity in perceptions.   
4. Size and evolution of the informal economy 
This section distills the empirical findings on the main features of the informal economy 
and its evolution over time. The informal economy is more prevalent in EMDEs than in 
advanced economies but is widely heterogeneous across countries and regions. Both 
output and employment measures of informality have trended downward since 1990. In 
contrast, survey-based measures relating to perceptions have tended to be highly stable, 
making them more appropriate for cross-country comparisons than for over-time analyses.   
Size of the informal economy. Globally, the informal economy accounted for 32-33 percent 
of GDP and 31 percent of employment over the period 1990-2018 (Table 1b). As shown 
in previous studies, a higher level of development, as measured by per capita income, is 
associated with lower informality, virtually regardless of the measure of informality, other 
than survey-based ones, or the year chosen (La Porta and Shleifer 2014). Thus, 
informality tends to be considerably more pervasive in EMDEs than in advanced 
economies: in advanced economies, it accounts for about 19 percent of GDP and 16 
percent of employment, on average, whereas in EMDEs it accounts for 36-37 percent of 
GDP and 39 percent of employment.   
 
18 In this section and below, self-employment is used to proxy for informal employment as in La Porta and 
Shleifer (2014), unless otherwise specified. In the following sections, “in percent of GDP or output” is used 
as the equivalent of “in percent of official GDP” in the context of the share of informal output (both DGE-
based and MIMIC-based estimates), and “in percent of employment” is used as the equivalent of “in percent 
of total employment.”   
 
 
There is wide heterogeneity in informal activity among EMDEs. For example, the 
informal economy’s share in GDP, while depending on the measure used, ranged from 
around 10 percent to 68 percent, and the share of self-employment in total employment 
ranged from near-zero to 96 percent. In addition, informality is common in all EMDE 
regions but takes different forms (World Bank 2012). On average, the informal economy’s 
share of output is highest in SSA, Europe and Central Asia (ECA), and Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC). The share of self-employment, however, is highest in SSA, 
South Asia (SAR), and East Asia and the Pacific (EAP; Figure 2).   
Evolution of the informal economy. The shares of both informal output and employment 
have declined since 1990, especially in EMDEs (Figure 3). Between 1990 and 2018, on 
average, the share of informal output in GDP fell by about 8 percentage points in EMDEs, 
to 31 percent, and by 3 percentage points in the advanced economies, to 17 percent. Over 
the same period, the average share of self-employment in total employment declined by 
about 3 percentage points in the advanced economies, to 14 percent, and by about 10 
percentage points in EMDEs, to 36 percent. In EMDEs, the largest declines in the shares 
of informal output and employment occurred from the early-2000s, in a reversal of a 
decade of a rising share of informal employment and barely shrinking share of informal 
output.19  In advanced economies, the largest declines in the share of informal employment 
occurred between the late 1990s and the global financial crisis of 2008-09; they have since 
partly reversed, amid anemic post-crisis growth.  
The declines in informality between 1990 and 2018 were broad-based, especially for 
output- and employment-based measures. Country-specific regressions of the shares of 
the informal economy in GDP and employment on a time trend were estimated to capture 
this secular decline.  In 69 (SEMP)-100 (DGE) percent of advanced economies (depending 
on the measure) and 54 (SEMP)-81 (MIMIC) percent of EMDEs, statistically significant 
downward trends in the share of the informal economy in GDP (or employment) were 
found. The trend decline in the share of informal output suggests that economic growth 
may be associated with more rapidly rising labor productivity in the formal economy than 
in the informal economy. As economies grow, formal-sector productivity growth may 
benefit from greater technological improvements and availability of capital than can be 
accessed by the informal sector (Amaral and Quintin 2006). In only a few cases did output 
and employment informality move in different directions. Noticeable drops in the share 
of informal output were associated with only moderate falls in the share of informal 
employment in some EMDEs, and even with increases in the share of informal 
employment in others.20  
 
19 The persistence of high levels of informality in EMDEs in the early 1990s in part reflects the expanding 
informal sector in Eastern and Central European economies during their economic transition (Kaufmann 
and Kaliberda 1996). By construction, slow-moving indicators for institutional quality in MIMIC estimates 
dampen these estimates’ movements over time. 
20 Vorisek et al. (2021) present a detailed discussion of the decline in informality across EMDE regions. 
 
 
Perceptions of informality appear to have changed much more slowly than actual informal 
output and employment. 21  In the majority of advanced economies and EMDEs, 
perceptions of the scale of informality— as measured by the WEF and WVS indices—
have not declined significantly since 1990. There are, however, a few exceptions. This 
often coincided with rapid GDP growth and reductions in the shares of both informal 
output and employment. 
5. Consistency among the various measures of informality 
The various measures of informality refer to three distinct aspects of it: output (DGE 
and MIMIC estimates), employment (for example, self-employment and workers without 
pensions), and perception (for example, the WEF and WVS surveys). While the common 
trends and correlates with economic development illustrated above suggest a considerable 
degree of commonality among some of these aspects, they also move slightly differently 
from time to time. This section explores the consistency among the various measures of 
informality.   
We illustrate this by examining correlations among various informality measures (both 
levels and first-differenced measures). 22 First, we check whether various measures are 
consistent with each other in terms of capturing an economy’s level of informality, or at 
least its position in cross-country rankings.  Since the informality measures have different 
units and definitions, Spearman rank correlation, which checks the statistical dependence 
between the rankings of two data series, is preferred here. The median rank correlations 
between different variables across countries within a single year are shown in Table 2. 
Second, we investigate whether various measures share the same movements over time. 
To do so, the share of country-pairs in which first differences in two measures have the 
same sign are calculated and reported in Table 3.   
Consistency in levels. The various measures for informality are generally positively 
correlated with each other, with the correlations within each block (output, employment, 
perception) being stronger than correlations between blocks (Table 2). The cross-country 
rank correlation between the two model-based estimates of informal output is close to 1 
and significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. In addition, the rank 
correlations between DGE estimates and both employment measures and some perception 
measures are also positive and significant. The correlations among the various measures 
of informal employment range from 0.20 to 0.94 and are mostly significant at the 10 
 
21  Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) demonstrate that perceptions of trustworthiness are largely 
historically determined with limited time-variance. 
22 Various additional correlations are calculated (e.g. both pairwise and rank correlations for a panel setting, 
cross-country within a specific year, and cross-year within a certain country, and with a longer time period). 
The results are largely in line with Table 2 and will be provided upon request. We also conduct a simple 
factor analysis using measures with sufficient coverage (i.e. DGE, MIMIC, SEMP, and WEF). The results 
show that these measures share a common factor, which explains 65-97 percent of the variation of the 
measures (97 percent for DGE, 97 percent for MIMIC, 65 percent for SEMP, and 69 percent for WEF).   
 
 
percent level. On average, the correlation between an estimate of informal output and 
employment-based measures is above 0.60 and significant at the 1 percent level.   
Perception-based estimates of informality tend to be more correlated with each other 
than with estimates of informal output or employment. The WVS is an exception: it 
tends to be uncorrelated or little correlated with all other measures, including perception-
based ones. This suggests that a large informal sector reflects more than citizens’ weak 
tax morality, which WVS purports to capture. Among the perception-based measures, 
the WEF, which purports to capture perceptions of the extent of informal economic 
activities, is the one most correlated with the other measures, both output-based (about 
0.70) and employment-based (about 0.50.7 with the share of labor force without pension 
and self-employment as a share of total employment).   
Consistency in changes over time. To examine the consistency of movements over time 
among various measures, the coincidence of the directions of movements in different 
variables is checked by looking at the shares of country-pairs in which first differences in 
two measures have the same sign (Table 3).23 This is the case in about 50 percent of all 
the country pairs—and highest, at 82 percent of country-year pairs, for informal 
employment and employment outside the formal sector. The directions of changes in 
output measures and employment measures coincide in 55-65 percent of country-year 
pairs, suggesting that output measures capture important additional factors to 
employment measures, such as changes in labor productivity or intensity of work.   
6. Cyclical features of the informal economy 
Like formal economies, informal economies feature business cycles, which share some 
features with those in the formal economy: they are stronger in EMDEs than in advanced 
economies, and they feature downturns and recoveries with similar speeds. That said, 
they are not fully synchronized with business cycles in the formal economy. This section 
distills the main cyclical features of the informal economy.24  
6.1 Volatility of formal and informal economies  
Formal and informal output and employment are significantly more volatile in EMDEs 
than in advanced economies, possibly reflecting larger shocks, or lesser resilience to 
shocks, in EMDEs (Table 4; Aguiar and Gopinath 2007; Neumeyer and Perri 2005; 
Restrepo-Echavarria 2014).25 In addition, in both EMDEs and advanced economies, self-
employment is somewhat more volatile than formal employment (that is total 
 
23 As a robustness check, the pairwise correlations of first-differenced informality measures over time for 
each country are calculated, with their medians computed across countries. The results are in line with 
Table 3. Whereas significant and positive correlations are observed among pension coverage, informal 
employment, and employment outside the formal sector, no significant correlations between informal 
employment (or perception) measures and informal output measures are found.   
24 Elgin et al. (2021) use the same set of informality measures to explore the links between formal and 
informal business cycles in greater detail and their implications for macroeconomic. 
25 Detailed results on the volatility of formal and informal economies are presented in Table 4.   
 
 
employment excluding self-employment), perhaps reflecting greater rigidity in the formal 
labor market (Djankov and Ramalho 2009).   
The business cycles of formal and informal economies are not entirely synchronous (as 
shown in Elgin et al. 2021). Employment growth in the informal sector is slightly, but 
statistically significantly, negatively correlated with employment growth in the formal 
sector.26 As a result, formal and informal employment alone are each more volatile than 
total employment (the sum of formal and informal employment).27  
6.2 Informal-economy business cycles 
Dating informal business cycles. Formal and informal business cycles were identified using 
the commonly used algorithm of Harding and Pagan (2002). Business cycle turning points 
are years in which output peaks or troughs. When there are several peaks or troughs 
within a five-year interval, the deepest trough or steepest peak was used. A recession is 
defined as the period from peak to trough, whereas an expansion is the converse, the 
period from trough to peak. A recovery, the early part of an expansion, is defined as the 
period during which output rebounds from the trough to its pre-recession peak. The main 
characteristics of the recession and recovery phases, including duration, amplitude, and 
slope, are defined as in Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2012; Annex). To remove the 
trend in employment, employment levels was logged and detrended using Hodrick–
Prescott filter. 
The results are in line with earlier studies (Bajada 2003; Birinci and Elgin 2013) of 
informal business cycle recessions and expansions in advanced economies. In contrast to 
these studies, however, the main focus here is on recessions and recoveries. Since 
recoveries are the early parts of expansions, they reflect more of an economy’s short-term 
cyclical movements rather than its long-term growth path.   
Output movements through informal-economy business cycles. Neither recessions nor 
recoveries in the informal economy differ statistically significantly from those in the 
formal economy (Tables 5a and 5b). The duration of both formal- and informal-economy 
recoveries was slightly longer than formal- and informal-economy recessions in EMDEs 
but not in advanced economies.28 The speed of recessions resembled that of recoveries in 
both formal and informal economies. As for formal economies, informal-economy 
recessions were steeper and informal economy recoveries were stronger in EMDEs than 
in advanced economies. As a result, output and employment in EMDEs tended to be 
more volatile than in advanced economies—a feature well documented in the literature 
(Aguiar and Gopinath 2007). One of the reasons could be the tendency for fiscal policy 
 
26 The pairwise correlation between employment growth in the informal sector and employment growth in 
the formal sector equals -0.2. 
27 This supports earlier findings that the informal sector may help stabilize total employment over business 
cycles (Fernández and Meza 2015; Loayza and Rigolini 2011).  
28 The differences in durations of recessions and recoveries are not significant for EMDEs when using 
MIMIC-based estimates.   
 
 
to be procyclical in EMDEs, exacerbating the underlying business cycle (Frankel, Végh, 
Vuletin 2013).  
Recessions. The average DGE-based informal economy recession lasted 1.5 years, with a 
GDP contraction, on average, of 3.5 percent per year, 5.2 percent from peak to trough, 
and 5.7 percent cumulatively—broadly in line with formal economy recessions.29 Both 
formal-economy and informal-economy recessions were significantly shallower in 
advanced economies than in EMDEs.   
Recoveries. On average, output in both formal and informal economies took about 2 years 
to return to their pre-recession peaks, expanding by 2-6 percent in the first year and by 
2-5 percent per year during the entire recovery phase.30 Like formal economy recoveries, 
informal-economy recoveries were significantly shallower in advanced economies than in 
EMDEs.   
Informal employment during informal-economy business cycles. Informal employment, 
proxied by self-employment, in both advanced economies and EMDEs was broadly stable 
in informal recessions as well as recoveries. This finding applies to both formal and 
informal economy business cycles (Table 6a). This may be because wage movements or 
changes in work intensity (measured as number of hours worked per day) bore the brunt 
of the adjustment in labor markets during business cycles (Guriev, Speciale, and Tuccio 
2019; Meghir, Narita, and Robin 2015).  
Formal and total employment during formal-economy business cycles. Total and formal 
employment in advanced economies behaved significantly differently from in EMDEs 
during formal economy recessions and recoveries (Table 6b). Both total and formal 
employment contracted significantly (by 2.5 and 2.7 percent, respectively) in advanced 
economies during formal economy recessions, while neither total nor formal employment 
fell significantly in EMDEs. Employment changes during formal-economy recoveries were 
insignificant in both advanced economies and EMDEs. The lack of significant responses 
in employment during formal economy recoveries suggests delayed responses in the labor 
market and the emergence of “jobless” recoveries in recent decades (Farbar 2012; Hall 
2005; Shimer 2010 and 2012).  
7. Conclusion 
Using a comprehensive database of model-based and survey-based estimates of informal 
economic activity, we compile a rich set of measures available for cross-country analysis 
and a more limited set of measures available for time-series or panel analysis. Among all 
 
29 The recessions of MIMIC-based informal output are slightly shallower and more prolonged than those of 
formal output and DGE-based informal output (Tables 5a and 5b). The slightly shallower recessions of 
MIMIC-based informal output could be due to the slow-moving institutional measures embedded in 
MIMIC’s estimation methods (for example, government effectiveness).  
30  MIMIC-based informal recoveries were significantly shorter, occurred less frequently, and were less 
pronounced than DGE-based informal recoveries and formal recoveries.   
 
 
the measures, DGE-based estimates and survey-based estimates of self-employment stand 
out in their cross-country and time coverage. In contrast, survey-based measures of 
perceptions tend to be highly stable over time and, therefore, are mainly useful for cross-
country comparisons. Lastly, for cross-country analyses of narrowly-defined questions, 
measures from labor, firm, and household surveys may be more suitable, especially when 
surveys are done consistently over time. 
We illustrate two applications of our database here. First, using the widest possible range 
of measures, the paper illustrates the broad-based and steady decline in the shares of 
informal output and employment since 1990. Three somewhat distinct aspects of 
informality are identified: output, employment, and perceptions. Cross-country rankings 
of informal output or employment are typically consistent with each other while varying 
over time.   
Second, we document that informal economies experience business cycles just as formal 
economies do. Like formal-economy output cycles, informal-economy output cycles tend 
to be shallower in advanced economies than in EMDEs. Informal employment tends to 
behave acyclically in EMDEs and advanced economies, being largely invariant to both 
output recessions and recoveries. In contrast to distinct cyclical movements in informal 
output, perceptions of the scale of informality shown by surveys are highly persistent.   
Several possible areas for further research are worth noting. First, the limitations of 
existing measures of informality remain, despite the richness of the database compiled 
here. More work is needed to improve the quality of informality series and to explore new 
approaches to better capture the extent of informality in EMDEs. Second, the paper 
distills the main features of informal economy business cycles. It does not look into the 
factors and policies that could affect informal economy business cycles. Further analysis 
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Figure 1. Informality: Magnitude, variety, and development challenges 
A. Shares of informal output and self-
employment 
B. Informal output and development 
  
C. Informal output, poverty, and income 
inequality 
D. Governance in EMDEs, by output 
informality 
  
Sources: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); International Labour Organization; World Bank (World Development Indicators, 
WDI; World Governance Indicators, WGI).  
Note: “High informality” (“Low informality”) indicates economies with above- (below-) median informal output (using DGE-based 
estimates). DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model-based estimates of informal output in percent of official GDP; EMDEs = 
emerging market and developing economies.    
A. Unweighted averages. Informal employment uses self-employment shares (in percent of total employment). Missing values are 
interpolated or filled using the latest available observations. World averages between 1990-2018 are in orange.  
B. Latest available year (2018). Orange line shows fitted values. “Ln (GDP per capita)” is the logarithm of GDP per capita (in 
constant 2010 U.S. dollars).  
C. Data are for 1990-2018. Group means (bars) and 90 percent confidence intervals (whiskers) are shown for poverty headcount ratio 
(percent of population living on $1.90 a day at 2011 PPP) and Gini coefficients.   
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Figure 2. Informality in EMDE regions 
A. DGE-based informal activity B. MIMIC-based informal activity 
  
C. Self-employment D. Labor force without pension 
  
E. Perceived informal activity F. Shares of EMDE regions in world 
output and employment 
  
Sources: International Labour Organization; World Bank (World Development Indicators); World Economic Forum.  
Note: Blue and red bars indicate group means for 2010-18 (2006-2016 for D), with whiskers indicating +/-1 standard deviation.   
DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model-based estimates on informal output; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and 
Central Asia; EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MIMIC = multiple 
indicators multiple causes model-based estimates on informal output; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia;  
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.   
C. Self-employment shares (in percent of total employment) is used here.   
E. Perceived informal activity is proxied by World Economic Forum Index, which ranges from “1= Most economic activity is 
undeclared or unregistered” to “7 = Most economic activity is declared or registered”. See Table 1a for details on data definitions.   
F. The stacked bars show the formal and informal output (employment) in each EMDE region as a share of the world’s total formal 
or informal output (employment) using data averaged from 2010-18. Formal output is proxied by official GDP, while DGE-based 
estimates are used to capture the level of informal output. Informal employment is proxied by self-employment, while formal 





































































































































































Figure 3. Evolution of informality, 1990-2018 
A. DGE-based informal activity B. MIMIC-based informal activity 
  
C. Self-employment D. Perceived informal activity 
  
E. Advanced economies with downward 
trends in informality 
F. EMDEs with downward trends in 
informality 
  
Source: World Bank; World Economic Forum.   
Note: See Table 1a for details on data definitions. DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model; EMDEs = emerging market and 
developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators multiple causes model; SEMP = self-employment in percent of total employment; 
WEF = World Economic Forum index of informality.   
A-D. Group means are calculated for advanced economies (in blue) and EMDEs (in red). 
C. Informal employment is proxied by self-employment in percent of total employment. Missing data for self-employment are 
interpolated in EMDEs for earlier years and filled using the latest available observation in recent years.   
D. WEF (World Economic Forum) index of informality is used, which ranges from “1= Most economic activity is undeclared or 
unregistered” to “7 = Most economic activity is declared or registered”. 
E-F. Data for the period 1990-2018. Based on country-specific linear regressions of the share of informality by each of the four measures 
of informality with a sufficiently long-time dimension. Figures show the share of advanced economies (E) and EMDEs (F) for which 
the time trend is statistically significantly negative (at least at 10 percent level). In F, missing values for self-employment are 
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DGE (% of GDP) 4,540 158 1990-2018 31.8 31.6 8.0 67.7 































t Pension coverage (% of labor force) 359 135 1990-2010 44.4 36.0 1.1 99.0 
Self-employment (% of total employment) 2,711 179 1990-2018 31.0 25.8 0.0 95.5 
Informal employment (% of total employment) 369 72 2000-2018 64.7 67.9 18.9 99.7 
Employment outside the formal sector 
(% of total employment) 























WB: % firms competing against informal firms 248 140 2006-2018 55.7 57.4 7.2 95.2 
WB: % firms formally registered when founded 233 138 2006-2018 89.0 91.3 29.1 100.0 
WB: Number of years operated without 
registration 
233 138 2006-2018 0.7 0.5 0.0 6.8 
WB: % firms that found competitors in the 
informal sector as a constraint 






WVS: Justifiable (Cheating on taxes) 200 94 1994-2010 2.3 2.1 1.0 4.7 
Sources: World Bank; World Bank (Enterprise Surveys); World Economic Forum; World Values Survey. 
Notes: Data for the period 1990-2018. DGE is benchmarked to Schneider et al. (2010).  World Value Survey (WVS) asks whether cheating on taxes is justifiable (1 is “never justifiable” 
and 10 is “always justifiable”) and reports average responses at the country-year level, with a higher level suggesting that the country is more tolerant towards the informal sector.  
World Economic Forum (WEF) asks “In your country, how much economic activity do you estimate to be undeclared or unregistered? (1= Most economic activity is undeclared or 
unregistered; 7= Most economic activity is declared or registered)” and reports average responses at the country-year level. Here the average responses have been reordered to make “7= 
Most economic activity is undeclared or unregistered; 1= Most economic activity is declared or registered” where a higher level suggesting a larger informal sector in the country. WB 
shows the results for World Bank Enterprise Surveys. HS stands for “Household surveys”, (a) stands for “Output”, and (b) stands for “Opinions/Tax Morality”. Detailed information is 






Table 1b. Summary statistics by country groupings 
  World AEs EMDEs 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Output     
DGE (% of GDP) 31.8 31.6 18.7 17.2 35.7 36.0 
MIMIC (% of GDP) 33.3 33.5 19.3 18.2 37.3 36.8 
Employment     
Pension coverage (% of labor force) 44.4 36.0 86.5 90.0 30.5 24.0 
Self-employment (% of total employment) 31.0 25.8 15.7 13.9 39.4 37.1 
Informal employment (% of total employment) 64.7 67.9 
  
64.7 67.9 
Employment outside the formal sector (% of total employment) 55.4 56.4     55.4 56.4 
Perception     
WEF (1-7=Most informal) 3.7 3.8 2.7 2.6 4.1 4.2 
WB: % firms competing against informal firms 55.7 57.4 35.8 35.0 57.0 59.7 
WB: % firms formally registered when founded 89.0 91.3 98.1 98.4 88.4 91.0 
WB: Number of years operated without registration 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.6 
WB: % firms that found competitors in the informal sector as a constraint 30.0 29.2 18.1 17.7 30.7 29.9 
WVS: Justifiable (Cheating on taxes) 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.1 
Sources: World Bank; World Bank (Enterprise Surveys); World Economic Forum; World Values Survey. 
Notes: Data for the period 1990-2018. AEs = advanced economies; DGE = dynamic general equilibrium model-based estimates of informal output in percent of official GDP; EMDEs = 
emerging market and developing economies; MIMIC = multiple indicators multiple causes model-based estimates on informal output in percent of GDP. World Values Survey (WVS) 
asks whether cheating on taxes is justifiable (1 is “never justifiable” and 10 is “always justifiable”) and reports average responses at the country-year level, with a higher level suggesting 
that the country is more tolerant toward the informal sector. World Economic Forum (WEF) asks, “In your country, how much economic activity do you estimate to be undeclared or 
unregistered? (1= Most economic activity is undeclared or unregistered; 7 = Most economic activity is declared or registered)” and reports average responses at the country-year level. 
Here, the average responses have been reordered to make “7= Most economic activity is undeclared or unregistered; 1 = Most economic activity is declared or registered” where a higher 
level suggesting a larger informal sector in the country. WB shows the results for World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Detailed information is listed in Table 1a. Country groupings follow 
the method used by World Bank (2020)
 
 
Table 2. Spearman rank correlations (across countries within individual years) 
 DGE MIMIC PENSION SEMP IF_EMP EMP_NF WEF WB1 WB2 WB3 WB4 WVS 
Output             
DGE (% of GDP) 1            
MIMIC (% of GDP) 0.98*** 1           
Employment             
Pension coverage  
(% of labor force) 
-0.60*** -0.60*** 1    
      
Self-employment 
 (% of total employment) 
0.64*** 0.62*** -0.86*** 1   
      
Informal employment  
(% of total employment) 
0.27* 0.31** -0.86*** 0.83*** 1  
      
Employment outside the formal sector 
(% of total employment) 
0.20 0.25 -0.60 0.77*** 0.94*** 1 
      
Perception             
WEF (1-7=Most informal) 0.67*** 0.70*** -0.47*** 0.68*** 0.54*** 0.50*** 1      
WB: % firms competing against 
informal firms 
0.40*** 0.40*** -0.07 0.33*** 0.38* 0.36 0.56*** 1     
WB: % firms formally registered when 
founded 
-0.28** -0.29** 0.67*** -0.54*** -0.53*** -0.57*** -0.54*** -0.60*** 1    
WB: Number of years operated without 
registration 
0.28** 0.28** -0.30 0.40*** 0.23 0.31* 0.41*** 0.38*** -0.72*** 1   
WB: % firms that found competitors in 
the informal sector as a constraint 
0.40*** 0.33*** 0.08 0.19* 0.28 0.32* 0.51*** 0.77*** -0.36*** 0.26* 1  
WVS: Justifiable (Cheating on taxes) 0.20 0.27* 0.31* -0.21 -0.2 -0.26 0.11 -0.21 0.33 -0.12 -0.21 1 
Sources: World Bank; World Bank (Enterprise Surveys); World Economic Forum; World Values Survey. 
Note: Data for the period 1990-2018. Medians of rank correlation of data across countries within each year. All survey-based measures are interpolated. DGE = dynamic general 
equilibrium model-based estimates of informal output in percent of official GDP; MIMIC = multiple indicators multiple causes model-based estimates on informal output in percent of 
GDP. PENSION = pension coverage in percent of labor force. SEMP=self-employment in percent of total employment. IF_EMP = informal employment in percent of total employment. 
EMP_NF = employment outside the formal sector in percent of total employment. World Values Survey (WVS) asks whether cheating on taxes is justifiable (1 is “never justifiable” 
and 10 is “always justifiable”) and reports average responses at the country-year level, with a higher level suggesting that the country is more tolerant toward the informal sector. World 
Economic Forum (WEF) asks, “In your country, how much economic activity do you estimate to be undeclared or unregistered? (1= Most economic activity is undeclared or unregistered; 
7 = Most economic activity is declared or registered)” and reports average responses at the country-year level. Here, the average responses have been reordered to make “7 = Most 
economic activity is undeclared or unregistered; 1 = Most economic activity is declared or registered” where a higher level suggesting a larger informal sector in the country. “WB” here 
stands for “World Bank. Enterprise Surveys.” Detailed information is listed in Table 1a. “***” implies significance at 1% level, “**” implies significance at 5% level, “*” implies 




Table 3. Coincidence of signs of first-differences  
  DGE MIMIC 
w/o 
PENSION 
SEMP INF_EMP EMP_NF WEF WVS 
DGE (% of GDP) 100 
       
MIMIC (% of GDP) 56.9 100 
      
Labor force without pension (% of labor force) 53.2 53.5 100 
     
Self-employment (% of total employment) 59.1 58.1 50.0 100 
    
Informal employment (% of total employment) 61.9 59.4 51.4 61.3 100 
   
Employment outside the formal sector  
(% of total employment) 
64.5 57.8 55.0 63.7 82.4 100 
  
WEF (1-7=Most informal) 50.3 56.2 50.0 50.3 57.9 54.5 100 
 
WVS: Justifiable (Cheat on taxes) 57.8 55.9 42.3 55.1 47.4 50.0 51.1 100 
Source: World Bank. 
Note: Data for the period 1990-2018. Shares of country-year pairs in which the first difference in the two measures has the same sign (opposite for PENSION) are shown. Survey-based 
estimates are interpolated to fill the gaps in data series. DGE is benchmarked to Schneider et al. (2010).  World Value Survey (WVS) asks whether cheating on taxes is justifiable (1 is 
“never justifiable” and 10 is “always justifiable”) and reports average responses at the country-year level, with a higher level suggesting that the country is more tolerant towards the 
informal sector.  World Economic Forum (WEF) asks “In your country, how much economic activity do you estimate to be undeclared or unregistered? (1= Most economic activity is 
undeclared or unregistered; 7= Most economic activity is declared or registered)” and reports average responses at the country-year level. Here the average responses have been reordered 
to make “7= Most economic activity is undeclared or unregistered; 1= Most economic activity is declared or registered” where a higher level suggesting a larger informal sector in the 




Table 4.  Volatility of formal and informal economies 
 
Output 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 Formal output DGE-based informal output MIMIC-based informal output 
World 6.42 5.83*** 5.04*** 
AEs 3.82^ 3.89^ 2.42^*** 
EMDEs 6.92 6.27*** 5.55*** 
 
Employment 
 [4] [5] [6] 
 Total employment Formal employment Self-employment 
World 3.46 5.16*** 6.69*** 
AEs 2.05^ 2.34^*** 4.88^*** 
EMDEs 3.84 5.90*** 7.31*** 
Source: World Bank. 
Note: Data are for the period 1990-2018. Formal output is captured by official GDP, while informal output uses DGE-based or 
MIMIC-based estimates. Total employment is the sum of formal employment and self-employment. Volatility shows the standard 
deviations (SDs) of the concerning variables’ annual growth rates. “***” implies significant differences at 1 percent level in the SDs 
of the annual growth rates of formal output and those of informal output in row [1]-[3] (in the SDs of the annual growth rates of 
total employment and those of formal/self-employment in row [4]-[6]). The shaded areas indicate that the SDs of the annual growth 
rates of DGE-based informal output (formal employment) significantly differ from those of MIMIC-based informal output (self-




Table 5a Cyclical features of recessions in formal and informal economy 
Formal Output  










1.5 -5.6 -6.5 -3.7 
[1.0] [-3.1] [-1.8] [-2.2] 
AEs 72 
1.5 -4.0* -4.0 -2.6** 
[1.0] [-2.4]** [-1.4]* [-2.0] 
EMDEs 235 
1.5 -6.0 -7.3 -4.0 
[1.0] [-3.1] [-2.0] [-2.4] 
DGE-based Informal Output  










1.5 -5.2 -5.7 -3.5 
[1.0] [-2.9] [-1.8] [-2.2] 
AEs 87 
1.6 -4.2 -4.8 -2.7** 
[1.0]** [-2.7] [-1.6] [-2.0] 
EMDEs 249 
1.5 -5.6 -6.1 -3.8 
[1.0] [-3.2] [-1.9] [-2.2] 
MIMIC-based Informal Output  










1.4 -4.2 -5.6 -2.7 
[1.0] [-2.1] [-1.1] [-1.7] 
AEs 44 
1.6 -2.7* -3.1 -1.5*** 
[1.0] [-0.7]** [-0.4]*** [-0.7]*** 
EMDEs 111 
1.4 -4.7 -6.4 -3.1 
[1.0] [-2.4] [-1.3] [-2.0] 
Source: World Bank. 
Note: Data for recession episodes starting and ending in the period 1990-2018. Business cycle turning points determined based on 
formal and informal GDP levels (i.e. official GDP statistics for formal output, DGE and MIMIC estimates for informal output) using 
the algorithm of Harding and Pagan (2002). Recession is defined as the phase from peak to trough while its corresponding “Duration”, 
“Amplitude”, “Cumulative loss” and “Slope” are defined as in Claessens et al. (2012). All statistics correspond to sample means. 
Medians are in brackets. Asterisks refer to the significant differences in means (or medians) between advanced economies (AEs) and 
emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). “***” implies significance at 1% level, “**” implies significance at 5% level, 
“*” implies significance at 10% level. Differences between informal and formal economies that are significant at 10 percent level are 










Table 5b Cyclical features of recoveries in formal and informal economy 
Formal Output 
  








2.1 5.4 4.6 
[1.5] [3.3] [2.1] 
AEs 37 
1.7 2.7** 2.0* 
[2.0] [2.3]** [1.1]** 
EMDEs 157 
2.1 6.1 5.2 
[1.6] [3.6] [2.4] 
DGE-based Informal Output 
  








2.0 4.1 3.6 
[2.0] [3.1] [2.2] 
AEs 58 
1.9 2.4*** 2.2** 
[2.0] [1.8]*** [1.5]*** 
EMDEs 178 
2.1 4.7 4.0 
[2.0] [3.7] [2.5] 
MIMIC-based Informal Output 
  








1.6 3.5 2.3 
[1.0] [3.0] [2.1] 
AEs 22 
1.5 1.9*** 1.4* 
[1.0] [1.7]*** [0.6]*** 
EMDEs 65 
1.7 4.1 2.6 
[1.0] [3.4] [2.1] 
Source: World Bank. 
Note: Data for recovery episodes starting and ending in 1990-2018. Business cycle turning points determined based on formal and 
informal GDP levels (i.e. official GDP statistics for formal output, DGE and MIMIC estimates for informal output) using the algorithm 
of Harding and Pagan (2002). Recovery is defined as the time it takes for output to rebound from the trough to the peak level before 
the recession while its corresponding “Duration”, “Amplitude”, and “Slope” are defined as in Claessens et al. (2012). All statistics 
correspond to sample means. Medians are in brackets. Asterisks refer to the significant differences in means (or medians) between 
advanced economies (AEs) and emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). “***” implies significance at 1% level, “**” 
implies significance at 5% level, “*” implies significance at 10% level. Differences between informal and formal economies that are 





Table 6a Informal employment during formal and informal business cycles 
  Formal output DGE-based informal output  MIMIC-based informal output  
  Recession Recovery Recession Recovery Recession Recovery 
World  
0.5 0.6 0.2 -0.4 -0.7 0.9 
[1.1] [0.3] [0.7] [0.2] [0.5] [0.1] 
AEs 
-0.7 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4 -1.3 -0.3 
[-0.2]** [0.03] [-0.3]* [-0.1] [-1.1]** [0.4] 
EMDEs 
1.3 1.1 0.8 -0.4 -0.3 1.5 
[2.1] [0.9] [1.2] [0.2] [1.4] [-0.9] 
 
Source: World Bank.  
Note: Data for the period 1990-2018. MIMIC = multiple indicators multiple causes model; DGE= dynamic general equilibrium model. Business cycle turning points determined based on 
formal and informal GDP levels (that is, official GDP statistics for formal output, DGE and MIMIC estimates for informal output) using the algorithm of Harding and Pagan (2002). 
Recession is defined as the phase from peak to trough while recovery is defined as the time it takes for output to rebound from the trough to the peak level before the recession (Claessens, 
Kose, and Terrones 2012). Expansion is defined as the period from trough to next peak (Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 2012). All statistics correspond to the sample means of the overall 
percentage changes in self-employment over the corresponding business cycle phases. Medians are in brackets. EMDEs with poor statistical capacity and three outliers (Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Zimbabwe) were dropped. Shaded cells represent numbers that significantly differ from zero. Asterisks refer to the significant differences in means (or 




Table 6b Formal and total employment during formal business cycles 
 Total employment Formal employment  
  Recession Recovery Recession Recovery 
World  
-0.6 1.3 -1.0 1.5 
[-0.3] [0.6] [-1.0] [0.6] 
AEs 
-2.5*** -0.4** -2.7*** -0.3** 
[-1.4]*** [-0.5]*** [-1.6] [-0.3]*** 
EMDEs 
0.7 2.1 0.1 2.5 
[1.2] [1.6] [-0.0] [2.1] 
 
Source: World Bank.  
Note: Data for the period 1990-2018. Formal employment is proxied by total employment excluding self-employment. Business cycle turning points determined based on official GDP 
statistics for formal output using the algorithm of Harding and Pagan (2002). Recession is defined as the phase from peak to trough while recovery is defined as the time it takes for 
output to rebound from the trough to the peak level before the recession (Claessens, Kose, and Terrones 2012). All statistics correspond to the sample means of the overall percentage 
changes in total (formal) employment over the corresponding business cycle phases. EMDEs with poor statistical capacity and three outliers (Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, and 
Zimbabwe) were dropped. Medians are in brackets. Shaded cells represent numbers that significantly differ from zero. Asterisks refer to the significant differences in means (or medians) 




The following section describes the methodologies that are employed to estimate measures 
of informality. Detailed data description is presented in Table A1.   
The multiple indicators multiple causes model (MIMIC model)  
To estimate the size of the informal sector in percent of official GDP with the MIMIC 
model, this study closely follows Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010) and includes 
six causes and three indicators used in their study.31 The six cause variables used are: 1) 
size of government (general government final consumption expenditure as a percent of 
GDP, from UN spliced with WDI); 2) share of direct taxation (direct taxes in percent of 
overall taxation, WDI); 3) fiscal freedom index from Heritage Foundation; 4) business 
freedom index from Heritage Foundation; 5) the unemployment rate and GDP per capita 
to capture the state of the economy (WDI, the latter is spliced with WEO); and 6) 
government effectiveness (Worldwide Governance Indicators). The three indicator 
variables include: 1) growth rate of GDP per capita (WDI, spliced with WEO); 2) the 
labor force participation rate (people over 15 economically active in percent of population, 
WDI, spliced with Haver Analytics), and 3) currency as a ratio of M0 (currency outside 
the banks) over M1 (IMF IFS and Haver Analytics).   
The estimation results are shown in Table A2. The model specification that ensures 
maximum data coverage (i.e. Column (5)) is used to generate the MIMIC index of the 
share of informal output relative to official GDP (?̃?𝑡). Then we conduct an additional 
benchmarking procedure where ηt̃t is converted into absolute values of the informal sector 
(𝜂?̂?) using the following equation:32  𝜂?̂? = ?̃?𝑡?̃?2000 𝜂2000∗ ,  (1) 
where t denotes year, η̃2000 is the value of the estimated index in the base year 2000, and η2000∗  is the exogenous estimate (base value) of the shadow economies in 2000. While the 
estimates (η̃t) determine the movement of the absolute values of the informal sector over 
time, the base values η2000∗  decide the rankings of the countries’ informal sector within 
the sample in year 2000. The base values η2000∗  are taken from Schneider (2007) or, for 
another 10 countries, from Schneider et al. (2010).  
The dynamic general equilibrium model (DGE)   
In the model, an infinitely-lived representative household is endowed with 𝐾0 units of 
productive capital and a total of 𝐻𝑡 > 0 units of time. The household has access to two 
productive technologies, denoted formal and informal, and maximizes its lifetime utility 
by solving the following optimization problem: 
 
31 MIMIC is a type of Structural Equation Model (SEM). The estimation of a SEM with latent variables 
can be done by means of LISREL (used by Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 2010), SPSS, and Stata. 
Here, Stata is used.  
32 Calibration is performed separately for each country. Following Schneider et al. (2010), the MIMIC index 
has been adjusted to the positive range by adding a positive constant. 
 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝐶𝑡, 𝐼𝑡, 𝐾𝑡+1, 𝑁𝐼𝑡, 𝑁𝐹𝑡}𝑡=0∞ ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑈(𝐶𝑡)∞𝑡=0  
s.t.  𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝐴𝐹𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼𝑁𝐹𝑡1−𝛼 + 𝐴𝐼𝑡𝑁𝐼𝑡𝛾    (2) 𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡          (3) 𝑁𝐼𝑡 + 𝑁𝐹𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡          (4) 𝛽 < 1 is a discount factor and the instantaneous utility function U(.) is strictly increasing 
and strictly concave. Eq(2) defines the household's resource feasibility constraint: the sum 
of consumption 𝐶𝑡 and investment 𝐼𝑡 should equal the amount produced using the formal 
and informal technologies. The right-hand side of Eq(2) shows that the formal technology 
(𝐴𝐹𝑡) follows a standard Cobb-Douglas specification and is exclusive to the formal sector. 𝐾𝑡 is the household's capital stock while 𝑁𝐹𝑡 is the number of hours the household devotes 
to the formal sector. 𝜏𝑡 captures the tax rate imposed on formal output. Informal output 
depends on the number of hours the household devotes to the informal sector, 𝑁𝐼𝑡 , and 
its technology, 𝐴𝐼𝑡.33 
The rest of the household's problem is standard: Eq(3) specifies the law of motion for 
capital, where 𝛿 ∈ [0; 1] is the depreciation rate. Eq(4) is the household's time constraint. 
In this simple model, the government's policy 𝜏𝑡 is assumed to be exogenously given and 
the tax revenue is assumed to be used to finance an exogenous stream of government 
spending, 𝐺𝑡. Then, given the government policy variable tax burden {𝜏𝑡}, a competitive 
equilibrium of the two-sector model is a set of sequences {𝐶𝑡, 𝐼𝑡, 𝐾𝑡+1, 𝑁𝐼𝑡, 𝑁𝐹𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡}𝑡=0∞  that 
maximize expected utility from consumption (i.e. ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑈(𝐶𝑡)∞𝑡=0 ). 
The model provides a reasonable mapping between the formal economy and informal 
economy in a dynamic setting. The two key equilibrium conditions are the equilibrium 
condition that connects the formal and informal economy through labor allocation, and 
the equilibrium condition that captures the intertemporal substitution. Our calibration 
and data construction rely on these two conditions to estimate the ratio, 𝑌𝐼𝑡𝑌𝐹𝑡, which can be 
further expressed as 𝐴𝐼𝑡𝑁𝐼𝑡𝛾𝐴𝐹𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼𝑁𝐹𝑡1−𝛼.  
The calibration follows Elgin and Oztunali (2012) and takes parameter values suggested 
by the earlier literature (e.g. Ihrig and Moe 2004).34 𝛼 is assumed to be equal to 0.36, and 𝛾 takes the value of 0.425. Data are gathered from PWT 9.0 for capital stock (𝐾𝑡), private 
consumption (𝐶𝑡), formal employment (𝑁𝐹𝑡), depreciation rates (𝛿, country averages), and 
tax rates (𝜏𝑡 ). By matching the productivity in the informal sector to the informal 
economy size in 2007 of the series reported in Schneider et al. (2010) and assuming that 
 
33 The model also assumes no cost for hiding income, that the government cannot enforce payment of taxes, 
and the household will attempt to hide any income received from the informal sector. 
34 Elgin and Oztunali (2012) are not using the model to do a full calibration exercise, where each equilibrium 
condition is satisfied for every period. Since only two of the equilibrium conditions are utilized, stationarity 
of empirical data for calibration is a lesser concern. Their approach is followed here. 
 
 
𝐴𝐼𝑡 grows at the average growth rate of 𝐾𝑡 and 𝐴𝐹𝑡,35 the DGE estimates are computed 
for 158 countries over the period 1950-2018. 
The estimation results are qualitatively robust to different model specifications such as 
using alternative values for 𝛿, 𝛼, 𝛾, adding labor-leisure choice, tax enforcement parameter 
to informal sector income (for example, using revenue in percent of GDP rather than 
government spending in percent of GDP for 𝜏𝑡), see Elgin and Oztunali (2012) for details. 
Labor-related measures of Informality   
Several cross-country databases report the survey-based estimates on the share of self-
employment in total employment:36 1) the 2016 World Development Indicators (World 
Bank 2016), which cover 175 economies from 1980 (mainly from 1990s) to 2014; 2) the 
International Labour Organization (2016), which covers 109 economies from 1997 to 2014; 
and 3) OECD (updated in 2016, 2018, and 2020), which covers 34 OECD countries from 
1955 to 2018. When regarding employment outside the formal sector and informal 
employment, ILO compiled statistics for up to 76 middle- and low-income countries for 
1999-2018.   
For a comprehensive dataset on labor-related measures on informality, we combine the 
cross-country databases, provided by WDI, ILO, and OECD, and gather additional data 
from the national statistical bureaus (offices), Haver Analytics, the disclosed Living 
Standards Measurement Studies (LSMS, World Bank), and spliced data from IADB and 
Eurostat to fill some gaps in years. Data priority is first given to cross-country databases 
(World Bank, ILO, and OECD) and then national statistical bureaus (offices), Haver 
Analytics, and LSMS, followed by estimates obtained from previous studies, IADB and 
Eurostat. IADB reports the share of self-employment in total employment (15-64 years 
old) for 19 Latin American economies between 1990 and 2018, while Eurostat reports the 
same measure for 29 EU economies and 5 non-EU economies for the period 19832018. By 
focusing on employment of the 15-64 years old groups, their data are systematically lower 
than those from other cross-country databases. The final step adds 105 more observations 
to the sample (3 percent of the full sample).  
The national statistical bureaus (offices) that provided data or were contacted are:  
Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Arab Republic of 
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, 
Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, 
Lithuania, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, 
 
35 This assumption implies that growth in the formal sector can spillover to the informal sector via capital 
accumulation and technological diffusion. 
36 Both ILO and WDI only report model-based estimates from 2018 onward, which may suffer from caveats 
such as strong economic assumptions and reliance on other studies’ independent estimates to do the 
benchmarking. Due to the issues related with model-based estimates, historical WDI and ILO reports are 
collected to obtain survey-based estimates. The model-based estimates from ILO and WDI were used to 
update the share of self-employment when no other source of information is available.    
 
 
Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, 
Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, 
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, 
Vietnam, and Republic of Yemen.   
Dating informal business cycles  
Identifying turning points. Following Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2012), Berge and 
Jorda (2011), and Harding and Pagan (2002), the Bry and Boschan (1971)’s algorithm is 
applied to date the business cycles of formal and informal sectors. Peaks (troughs) are 
defined as occurring at time t whenever {Δyt>(<)0, Δyt +1<(>)0}. As the censoring rule, 
if there are additional peaks/troughs within a 5-year period around a peak, the one with 
the deepest contraction/expansion is picked. When calculating characteristics of business 
cycles, the closest peaks (troughs) before troughs (peaks) are used when there are several 
peaks (troughs) in a row.  
Characteristics of business cycle phases. The main characteristics of the recession and 
recovery phases, including duration, amplitude, and slope, are defined as in Claessens, 
Kose, and Terrones (2012):  
• The duration captures, for a recession, the period from peak to trough and, for a 
recovery, the period it takes for output to return to its pre-trough peak.   
• The amplitude of a recession measures the change in output from a peak to the next 
trough. The amplitude of a recovery measures the change in output during the first 
year of an expansion, which is the period between a trough and its following peak.  
• The slope measures the speed of a given cyclical phase. It is defined as the ratio of 
amplitude over duration for a recession phase and the ratio of the change from the 
trough to the last peak divided by the duration for a recovery phase.   
For recessions only, another widely used measure, cumulative loss, is calculated. It 
captures the overall cost of a recession. The cumulative loss is defined as the difference 
between the sum of annual changes in output and half of the amplitude during a recession.   
 
 
Table A1. Summary of Data Coverage  





Author’s calculations Size of the informal sector as a percentage of official GDP estimated 
using the model of Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010) 





Author’s calculations Size of the informal economy as a percentage of official GDP estimated 
using the approach of Elgin and Oztunali (2012). 
158 1950-2018 Balanced panel 
Share of self-employment Labor force survey 
and household 
survey 
WDI, ILO, OECD, National 
Statistical Offices, Eurostat, 
IADB, Haver Analytics, and 
LSMS. 
The share of self-employment in total employment (survey-based 
estimates). 
180 1955-2018 Unbalanced panel 
Share of informal 
employment 
Labor force survey 
and household 
survey 
ILO The share of informal employment in percent of total employment 
(harmonized) 
72 2000-2018 Repeated cross-
sections 
Share of employment 
outside the formal sector 
Labor force survey 
and household 
survey 
ILO The share of employment outside the formal sector in percent of total 
employment (harmonized) 
76 1999-2018 Unbalanced panel 
Pension coverage Labor force survey 
and household 
survey 
WDI The fraction of the labor force that contributes to a retirement pension 
scheme 
135 1990-2010 Unbalanced panel 
World Bank Enterprises 
Survey 
Firm survey World Bank Enterprise 
Survey 
Four measures on informality: percent of firms competing against 
unregistered or informal firms, percent of firms formally registered when 
they started operations in the country, (average) number of years a firm 
operated without formal registration, and percent of firms identifying 
practices of competitors in the informal sector as a major constraint.  
140 2006-2018 Repeated cross-
sections 
World Economic Forum 
(Executive Opinion 
Survey) 
Firm survey World Economic Forum The extent of informal economy based on the question: “In your 
country, how much economic activity do you estimate to be undeclared 
or unregistered? (1 = Most economic activity is undeclared or 
unregistered; 7 = Most economic activity is declared or registered)” 
154 2008-2018 Balanced panel 
dataset 
Informal Market Index 
(Heritage Foundation) 
Firm survey Heritage Foundation The subjective perceptions of general compliance with the law, with 
particular emphasis on the role played by official corruption. The index 
ranges from 1 to 5 with higher values indicating more informal market 
activity.  
165 1995-2005 Balanced panel 
dataset 
Non-observed activities 
(% of GDP) 
National account 
approach 
UN (2008) Non-observed activities (% of GDP) 44 Various years Cross-sectional 
data 
The Eurobarometer 
Survey: Indirect measure 
of the informal economy 
Household surveys 
and social opinion 
surveys 
The Eurobarometer Survey Interviewers ask respondents whether he/she has purchased goods or 
serviced embodied undeclared work or supplied labor in the informal 
economy. The survey also includes information on whether the 
respondents receive all or part of their regular salary or the 
remuneration for extra work or overtime hours as cash-in-hand and 
without declaring it to tax or social security authorities. Finally, the 
survey shows whether respondents find informal economic activities 
acceptable.  
27 2007 and 2013 Repeated cross-
sections 
World Values Survey: 
Tax morale 
Household surveys 
and social opinion 
surveys 
World Values Survey Interviewers ask whether respondents can justify cheating on taxes. 
Detailed descriptions are reported in Table A3. 





European Values Survey: 
Tax morale 
Household surveys 
and social opinion 
surveys 
European Values Survey Interviewers ask whether it is justifiable for the respondents or their 
compatriots to cheat on taxes or pay cash to avoid taxes. 





European Social Survey: 
Indirect measure of the 
informal economy 
Household surveys 
and social opinion 
surveys 
European Social Survey Interviewers ask whether respondents paid cash for goods or services 
with no receipt so as to avoid VAT or taxes over the past five years and 
whether respondents have a written employment contract. 







Table A2. MIMIC Model Estimation Results (1993-2018) 
 













Size of government 0.134*** 0.144*** 0.149*** 0.161*** 0.152***  
(0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) 









Business Freedom 0.047** 0.029 0.050** 
  
 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.022) 
  
Fiscal Freedom 0.008 -0.018 -0.038 
  
 
(0.024) (0.019) (0.023) 
  
Unemployment rate 0.077*** 0.104*** 0.059*** 0.073*** 0.071***  
(0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
GDP per capita -0.311*** -0.239*** -0.348*** -0.327*** -0.334***  
(0.034) (0.026) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021) 
Government effectiveness   -0.070*** -0.059*** -0.060***    
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
Growth rate of GDP per capita -0.679*** -0.738*** -0.421*** -0.312*** -0.298***  
(0.119) (0.105) (0.079) (0.060) (0.060) 
Labor force participation rate -0.297*** -0.222*** 
 








   
(0.066) 
  
Currency (M0/M1) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Statistical tests 
RMSEA 0.066 0.054 0.073 0.081 0.082 
p(RMSEA<=0.05) 0.027 0.268 0.000 0.000 0.000 










AIC 30360.170 37812.139 46480.999 48963.901 50399.970 
BIC 30437.337 37888.618 46568.955 49040.351 50476.798 
CFI  0.755 0.827 0.733 0.781 0.773 
TLI  0.572 0.689 0.543 0.589 0.574 
SRMR  0.034 0.029 0.043 0.042 0.043 
CD 0.602 0.930 0.975 1 1 
Observations 1,267 1,742 1,803 2,646 2,724 
Note: Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% significance levels. All variables are used 
as their standardized deviations from the mean. Data sources for variables used in the model are listed in Section II footnote 6. 
Following the MIMIC models’ identification rule, the currency (M0/M1) variable is fixed to an a priori value. The currency variable 
shows the level of money(cash) in circulation. “AIC” stands for “Akaike’s information criterion” and “BIC” stands for “Bayesian 
information criterion. “RMSEA” stands for “Root Mean Square Error of Approximation”. “TLI” stands for “Tucker Lewis Index”, 
“CFI” stands for “Comparative Fit Index”, “SRMR” stands for “Standardized Root Mean Square Residual”, and “CD” shows the 
coefficient of determination. These are goodness-of-fit statistics. 
 
 
Table A3. World Value Survey, European Value Surveys and European Social Surveys 
Survey Coverage 
World Value Survey 
(WVS) 
Questions: "Justifiable: cheating on taxes". 
1 is “never justifiable” and 10 is “always justifiable” 
WVS 1981-1984 9 countries/regions: Argentina, Australia, Finland, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, South 
Africa, Sweden, and United States 
WVS 1989-1993 16 countries/regions:  Argentina, Brazil, Belarus, Chile, China, India, Japan, South Korea, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey. 
WVS 1994-1999 52 countries/regions: Albania, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh,  Armenia, 
Bulgaria, Belarus, Chile, China, Taiwan, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Rep.,  Dominican Rep. , 
El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, India, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, Macedonia, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, West 
Germany, East Germany, Bosnia. 
WVS 2000-2004 37 countries/regions:  Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Canada, Chile, 
China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Serbia, Singapore, 
Viet Nam, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Spain, Uganda, Macedonia, Egypt, Tanzania, United 
States, Venezuela. 
WVS 2005-2009 56 countries/regions: Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, 
Taiwan, Colombia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Hong, Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, New, Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Viet, Nam, Slovenia, South, Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad, and, Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, Egypt, United, Kingdom, 
United, States, Burkina, Faso, Uruguay, Serbia, and, Montenegro, Zambia. 
WVS 2010-2014 57 countries/regions: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Australia, Armenia, Brazil, Belarus, 
Chile, China, Taiwan, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Estonia, Georgia, Palestine, Ghana, 
Hong, Kong, India, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Jordan, South, Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New, Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovenia, South, Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad, and, Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Egypt, United, States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yemen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
